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Dismal Science:  
 
Chaucer and Gower on Alchemy and Economy 
 
 
 Alchemy holds a fascination for modern times, as the forerunner of chemistry and 
perhaps the precursor of modern science, as a lore of the occult, or as a model for 
alternative spiritual or psychological systems.1  But alchemy is most often invoked as a 
                                                 
1 The literature on the history of alchemy and its relation to the rise of science is 
voluminous; some notable contributions include: Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and 
the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Robert P. 
Multhauf, The Origins of Chemistry (London: Oldbourne, 1966); Allen G. Debus, The 
Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian Science and Medicine in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Science History Publications, 1977); Betty Jo Teeter 
Dobbs, The Janus Face of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton’s Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); William R. Newman and Lawrence M. 
Principe, Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian 
Chymistry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). On the current standing of 
alchemy in the history of science, see two recent assessments: Lawrence M. Principe, 
“Alchemy Restored,” Isis 102 (2011): 305-312; William R. Newman, “What Have We 
Learned from the Recent Historiography of Alchemy?” Isis 102 (2011): 313-321.  
Principe and Newman critique the ahistorical nature of much nineteenth- and twentieth-
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metaphor, usually in one of two ways.  It can stand for a mysterious and magical process, 
or it can serve as an emblem of deliberately deceptive hokum.  In particular, it functions 
as a metaphor for the perpetually abstruse processes of the commercial economy.  For 
Marx, alchemy is the master trope for the inexorable power of capitalism to convert all 
things into commodities: “Not even are the bones of saints, and still less are more delicate 
res sacrosanctae, extra commercium hominum able to withstand this alchemy.”2  On the 
other hand, George Soros, one of the most successful private financiers in history, 
entitled his first book The Alchemy of Finance.3  And the recent book by the economics 
                                                                                                                                                 
century occult and mystical reception of alchemy in “Some Problems with the 
Historiography of Alchemy,” in Secrets of Nature: Astrology and Alchemy in Early 
Modern Europe, edited by William R. Newman and Anthony Grafton (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2001), pp. 385-431. 
2 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, trans. Samuel Moore 
and Edward Aveling (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), Volume 1, p. 132.  Marx also 
uses alchemy as a metaphor for the fraud underlying capitalist accumulation; he says of a 
colonial governor in India, “His favorites received contracts under conditions whereby 
they, cleverer than the alchemists, made gold out of nothing” (704).  On alchemical 
language and thought in Marx, see Karen Pinkus, Alchemical Mercury: A Theory of 
Ambivalence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), particularly Chapter 6, 
“Reading Capital I Alchemically,” pp. 141-157. 
3 George Soros, The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1994).  Soros does not use the metaphor of alchemy casually, and he 
does not employ it as a shorthand for occult wisdom.  Rather, he sees alchemy as 
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columnist Neil Irwin about the central bankers who used every legal and fiduciary means 
at their disposal to address the global financial crisis of 2008 is called The Alchemists.4  
Then there are the comments of Larry Summers, economic advisor to President Obama, 
on Mitt Romney’s budget plan during the 2012 United States presidential election: “This 
is alchemy...  Lead cannot be turned into gold. Two plus two cannot equal five... And 20 
percent across-the-board tax cuts cannot be squared with balanced budgets without 
raising middle-class taxes or eviscerating government.”5  Alchemy is that which is 
obscure in its operation, but somehow works; it is also that which seems to work, but 
does not.  
In the late Middle Ages, alchemy’s social position was shifting and uncertain.  It 
had an ancient lineage and an extensive written tradition, but it was never incorporated 
into the standard curricula of schools or universities; it was variously condemned and 
endorsed by scholarly authorities; its practitioners were notorious in popular imagination 
                                                                                                                                                 
analogous to market analysis in that it is practical without being scientific or even entirely 
rational: “Scientific theories are judged by the facts; financial decisions are judged by the 
distorted views of the participants.  Instead of scientific method, financial markets 
embody the method of alchemy” (304). 
4 Neil Irwin, The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire (New York: 
Penguin, 2013). 
5 Bonnie Kavoussi, “Larry Summers: Mitt Romney’s Budget Plan is ‘Alchemy,’” The 
Huffington Post, October 23, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/larry-
summers-mitt-romney_n_2005026.html.  
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for delusion and chicanery, but they could also be patronized by courts and princes.6  
Alchemy and alchemists appear only occasionally in medieval literature, but the art 
figures at significant points in the two great tale collections of fourteenth-century 
England.7  John Gower praises it in the fourth book of Confessio Amantis.  Chaucer, after 
a number of pejorative asides, abruptly and belatedly introduces alchemy into the 
Canterbury Tales and then debunks it at considerable length in the Canon’s Yeoman’s 
Prologue and Tale.  
Critics attempting to explain such literary uses of alchemy have frequently and 
rightly taken it as metaphorical for economic operation.  But the medieval authors 
understood neither alchemy nor economics in the same manner that later writers would. 
Like moderns, Gower and Chaucer saw in alchemy analogies to the commercial 
economy.  But unlike most modern thinkers, Gower and Chaucer interpreted alchemy as 
an inverted analogy, seeing its processes as opposite to the workings of economic forces.  
The poets’ very different depictions of alchemy and alchemists therefore reveal the 
profound contrasts in their views of money and economy. 
                                                 
6 See Will H. L. Ogrinc, “Western Society and Alchemy from 1200 to 1500,” Journal of 
Medieval History 6 (1980): 103-32; William R. Newman and Anthony Grafton, 
“Introduction: The Problematic Status of Astrology and Alchemy in Premodern Europe,” 
in Newman and Grafton, eds., Secrets of Nature, pp. 1-38. 
7 Of course, alchemy has its own literature, including alchemical poetry.  See the two-part 
article by Didier Kahn, “Alchemical Poetry in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Part 
I—Preliminary Survey,” Ambix 57 (2010): 249-74, and “Part II—Synthesis,” Ambix 58 
(2011): 62-77. 
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Gower: “The science of himself is trewe”  
Two thirds of the way through Book 4 of Confessio Amantis, Genius chooses to 
counterbalance his indictment of Sloth with some praise of its opposite, industriousness. 
What follows is a catalogue of various fields of liberal arts, natural philosophy, and 
technology, from poetry, music, painting, and sculpture, to fishing, metallurgy, textiles, 
augury, and cuisine.  For each of these Gower identifies, though sometimes rather 
idiosyncratically and obscurely, the legendary or mythical founder of the discipline.  But 
at one point, Gower expounds, at much greater length, on  
thilke experience, 
Which cleped is alconomie  
Wherof the selver multeplie 
Thei made and ek the gold also.  [4.2458-61]8 
“Alconomie,” according to Gower, posits seven material elements, each associated with a 
planet.  These elements exist in a continuum, running from gold at one extreme to silver 
at the other: 
For as the philosphre tolde 
Of gold and selver, thei ben holde 
Tuo principal extremites 
To whiche alle othre be degres 
Of the metalls ben accordant...   [4.2487-91] 
                                                 
8 All quotations of Confessio Amantis are taken from the edition of Russell A. Peck, vols. 
1-3 (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000-2004). 
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There are, Gower says, three “philosophers’ stones.”  The first two are the lapis 
vegetabilis, which has the power “to kepe and to preserve / The bodi fro siknesses alle / 
Til deth of kinde upon him falle” (4.2538-40), and the lapis animalis, which is able to 
heighten and maintain the five senses, “wherof a man mai hiere and se / And smelle and 
taste in his degré, / And for to fiele” (4.2545-47).9  It is the third stone, the mineral stone, 
that has the power to refine any metal, removing any impurities (4.2555-56).10  Since 
gold and silver are the purest extremes in the continuum of metals, 
This mineral, so as I finde, 
Transformeth al the ferste kynde 
And makth hem able to conceive 
Thurgh his vertu, and to receive 
Both in substance and in figure 
Of gold and selver the nature.  [4.2559-64]  
This increase of gold, Gower acknowledges, is the ultimate goal of alchemy and 
alchemists: “For to the rede and to the whyte”—standard alchemical figures for gold and 
                                                 
9 On Gower’s alchemical philosophy, see George Fox, The Mediaeval Sciences in the 
Works of John Gower (1931; reprint New York: Haskell House, 1966), pp. 114-135. 
10 Gower seems to equate the “mineral stone” and the “elixir”; in other sources, the elixir 
is a substance made from the philosophers’ stone and used for transmutation.  The three 
distinct stones seem to be unique to Gower; they may derive from Gower’s 
misinterpretation of passages in other sources describing categories of materials used to 
create the philosophers’ stone.  See Fox, Mediaeval Sciences, pp. 127-28.   
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silver—“This ston hath pouer to profite. / It makth multiplicacioun / Of gold” (4.2571-
74). 
 Gower, like many medieval writers, credits Hermes Trismegistus with the 
founding of alchemy.  Gower also cites Geber, Ortolan, Morien, and Avicenna as 
authorities on the craft.  Gower’s own sources seem to have included Vincent of 
Beauvais, Arnaldus of Villanova, Roger Bacon, the Libellus de Alchimia ascribed to 
Albertus Magnus, and other widely circulated texts.11  Gower’s descriptions of alchemy, 
therefore, could be called, as they often have been, conventional—but for the fact that 
there were competing conventions.   
 Gower was approaching alchemy at an unstable period in its history.  The craft 
was introduced to Europe via Arabic texts in the twelfth century and would flourish in the 
Early Modern period, but in the thirteenth century alchemy had become a point of 
intellectual controversy.12  Thirteenth-century authorities, notably Albertus Magnus, 
wrote generally favorably of alchemy, and Roger Bacon defended it vigorously. But other 
scholastics, including Giles of Rome, expressed reservations about the value of its 
supposed productions, and a Latin translation of an Arabic anti-alchemical text was 
                                                 
11 See Fox, Mediaeval Sciences, and Peck’s note to Confessio 4.2468-78. 
12 See Lawrence M. Principe, The Secrets of Alchemy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2013), pp. 51-82.  See also Ogrinc, “Western Society,” pp. 104-107; Multhauf, 
Origins of Chemistry, pp. 143-200; Debus, Chemical Philosophy, pp. 11-14.  
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widely received as the work of Albert.13  After convening a debate on the issue, Pope 
John XXII condemned the practices of alchemists in a decretal in 1317, declaring, “Poor 
themselves, the alchemists promise riches which are not forthcoming; wise also in their 
own conceit, they fall into the ditch which they themselves have digged.”14  In the 
fifteenth century several European countries would ban the practice of alchemical 
transmutation; Henry IV of England passed such a decree in 1404.15 
 Poets of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries varied in their representations of 
alchemy.  Jean de Meun, in his discussion of the powers of Art and Nature, says that Art 
“may learn enough alchemy to be able to colour every metal, but she would kill herself 
before she could transmute the species, unless she first reduced them to their elemental 
                                                 
13 See William R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect 
Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 43-54.  See also Principe, The 
Secrets of Alchemy, pp. 58-62. 
14 Quoted in Edgar H. Duncan, “The Literature of Alchemy and Chaucer’s Canon’s 
Yeoman’s Tale: Framework, Theme, and Characters,” Speculum 43 (1968): 633-56 
(636).  See also Principe, Secrets of Alchemy, p. 61; J. R. Partington, “Albertus Magnus 
on Alchemy,” Ambix 1 (1937): 3-20.  The Latin text of the decretal is printed in Sources 
and Analogues of Chaucer’s “Canterbury Tales,” edited by W. F. Bryan and Germaine 
Dempster (New York: Humanities Press, 1958 (1941)), pp. 691-92. 
15 Principe, Secrets of Alchemy, p. 62.  Petitioners were occasionally granted license to 
practice alchemy;  the ban was ultimately lifted in 1689.  See Duncan, “Literature of 
Alchemy,” p. 634; D. Geoghagen, “A License of Henry VI to Practise Alchemy,” Ambix 
6 (1957): 10-17. 
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matter; if she worked all her life she would never catch up with Nature.”  But he then 
adds, “It is worthy of note, nevertheless, that alchemy is true art, and that anyone who 
worked at it seriously would discover great marvels.”16  Petrarch, in Remedies for 
Prosperity, addresses alchemy in a dialogue of Hope and Reason: 
HOPE:  I hope for good results with alchemy. 
REASON: It is surprising that you hope for something which never happened to 
you or anyone else.  All reports that it happened to some are fabricated by 
people who have found it expedient to believe so... 
HOPE:  The alchemist promises me great things. 
REASON:  Tell him to perform for himself what he promises to others, and to 
cure his own poverty first.  Alchemists are an indigent lot who admit that 
they are paupers but wish to enrich others as though the poverty of others 
were more troublesome to them than their own.  Wretched themselves, 
they protest impudently that they take pity on others and promise great 
things, sometimes even to people they do not know at all.  O what rotten 
promises, what stupid credulity!17 
                                                 
16 The Romance of the Rose, trans. and ed. Frances Horgan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 248-49.  On Jean de Meun’s treatment of alchemy, see Newman, 
Promethean Ambitions, pp. 77-82. 
17 Conrad H. Rawski, Petrarch’s Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul: A Modern English 
Translation of De remediis utriusque Fortune, with a Commentary, Volume 1 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 299-300. 
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In Gower’s England, Langland apparently harbors the popular suspicion that alchemy is a 
form of dark magic.  In Piers Plowman, Dame Study warns Will against those sciences 
that are mere “fybicches” (tricks) that she invented solely to mislead human minds:   
Yut are thre fybicches of forels of manye mannys wittes, 
Of experimens of alkonomye, of Albertes makyng, 
Nigramauncie and permancie, the pouke to reyse; 
Yif thou thinke Dowel, del therwith nevere. 
Al these sciences, sikerly, I myself founded— 
Founded hem formest folk to deseyven.18 
Gower, therefore, has no single, conventional path when approaching alchemy.  
He chooses to praise it at length.  He does ultimately declare that the contemporary 
practice is unwise and that those who pursue the alchemy are unlikely to be able to 
duplicate the successes of the ancient practitioners, making it essentially a lost art: 
 Bot now it staunt al otherwise; 
 Thei speken faste of thilke ston, 
 Bot hou to make it, nou wot non 
 After the sothe experience. 
 And natheles get diligence 
 Thei setten upon thilke dede, 
                                                 
18 Piers Plowman: The A Version, edited by Míceál F. Vaughan (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2011), XI.161-66.  Compare B Version, X.212-21.  Piers 
Plowman: The B Version, edited by George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988). 
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 And spille more than thei spede; 
 For allewey thei finde a lette, 
 Which bringeth in poverte and dette 
 To hem that riche were afore. 
 The lost is had, the lucre is lore, 
 To gete a pound thei spenden fyve; 
 I not hou such a craft schal thryve 
 In the manere as it is used: 
 It were betre be refused 
 Than for to worchen upon weene 
 In thing which stant noght as thei weene. [4.2580-96] 
Yet Gower is acknowledging that alchemy is at heart a “sothe experience”—empirical 
fact—and he is at pains to insist that alchemical theory and its lore are natural, 
authoritative, and genuine: 
 For thei be whom this art was founde 
 To every point a certain bounde 
 Ordeignen, that a man mai finde 
 This craft is wroght be weie of kinde, 
 So that ther is no fallas inne. [4.2505-09] 
What makes this curious is that Gower uncharacteristically ignores the moral 
questions that haunted alchemy in the late Middle Ages.  Contemporary authorities did 
not merely question whether some practicing alchemists were charlatans or fools.  They 
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also expressed reservations about what alchemy actually achieved when it was successful 
and the moral and social ramifications of the art.  
The concern of intellectual critics in Gower’s time was not so much that 
alchemists were unable to perform the functions they claimed, but that alchemy, if 
efficacious, might be false and misleading.  As William Newman has explained, the 
debate hinged on a perceived conflict between Art and Nature—the question of whether 
any product of human artifice could equal, or even improve, received creation, a question 
ultimately of profound importance to humanistic thought and to conceptions of science 
and technology.19  A point of debate among scholastics like Albert Magnus and Giles of 
Rome was whether the precious metals produced by alchemists were true gold and silver 
or synthetic and therefore artificial gold and silver, differing in some fundamental 
(though perhaps imperceptible) way from the real metals.20  As Aquinas comments: 
Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and 
other like things made from them, but also on account of the excellence and purity 
of their substance.  Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the 
true specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust, 
especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their natural 
action, which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce...  If 
however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to 
sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain 
                                                 
19 See Newman, “Alchemy and the Art-Nature Debate,” in Promethean Ambitions, pp. 
34-114. 
20 Ibid., pp. 51-54. 
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natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as Augustine says... 
of things produced by the art of the demons.21 
In either case, critics saw economic implications in the validity of the precious metals 
that secured the value of currency.  If alchemical gold was false, it could force true gold 
out of the marketplace, destabilizing the value of currency; if alchemists were to produce 
true gold in significant quantities, it could potentially devalue currency by deflating the 
value of gold.22  Alchemists, therefore, could be seen as a kind of counterfeiters.  In his 
decretal, Pope John XXII declares that “though there is no such thing in nature, they 
pretend to make genuine gold and silver by a sophistic transmutation; to such an extent 
does their damned and damnable temerity go that they stamp upon the base metal the 
characters of public money for believing eyes.”23  
It is for these reasons that Dante confines alchemists in one of the deepest 
portions of Hell, the tenth and final bolgia of the eighth circle, “where the ministress of 
the High Lord, infallible Justice, punishes the falsifiers” (XXIX.55-57).24  Here, where 
                                                 
21 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Translated by Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947-48), p. 4701. 
22 See Principe, Secrets of Alchemy, pp. 59-60.  See also Newman, Promethean 
Ambitions, p. 131. 
23 Duncan, “The Literature of Alchemy,” p. 637.  See also Principe, Secrets of Alchemy, 
p. 61.  
24 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy: Inferno, trans. Charles S. Singleton (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1970).  It is worth noting that Dante and Virgil left the 
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the air is poisoned with contagion and there are “spirits languishing in divers heaps” 
(XXIX.66), Dante encounters two souls.  The first says that he was executed by Albero of 
Siena for falsely claiming that he could teach him to fly, adding, “But, for the alchemy I 
practiced in the world, Minos, to whom it is not allowed to err, condemned me to this last 
pouch of the ten” (XXIX.118-20). The second points even more explicitly to the deceitful 
art of alchemy: “I am the shade of Capocchio, who falsified the metals by alchemy; and 
you must recall, if I rightly eye you, how good an ape of nature I was” (XXIX.136-39). 
Note that Dante is not condemning alchemists for falsely claiming to be able to 
transmute metals.  Rather, Dante’s alchemists are languishing at the bottom of the eighth 
circle because the precious metals that they transform other metals into are not the true 
gold and silver that they seem to be, and this makes them a species of falsifiers or 
counterfeiters.  
And yet Gower, normally as concerned as Dante with adjudging and critiquing 
the moral status of individuals and classes, has only praise for alchemy’s inventors and 
original practitioners.  Gower emphasizes the truth and indeed the virtue of the craft:  
 Bot noght forthi, who that it knewe, 
 The science of himself is trewe 
 Upon the forme as it was founded, 
 Wherof the names yit ben grounded 
 Of hem that ferste it founden oute; 
 And thus the fame goth aboute 
                                                                                                                                                 
usurers sitting on burning sands back in the seventh circle, with sinners against nature—
plenty deep, but not nearly so deep as falsifiers like the alchemists.  
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 To suche as soghten besinesse 
 Of vertu and of worthinesse. [4.2597-2604] 
 It is perhaps not so surprising that in a section devoted to disciplines of science 
and learning Gower chooses the side of human artifice in a debate between art and nature.  
But what makes his defense of the empirical and moral validity of alchemy particularly 
puzzling is its position within the Confessio.  This section, late in Book 4, comes just 
before the mammoth Book 5, and its extended critique not just of the sin of avarice but 
specifically of commerce and money.  
Gower’s economic critique derives ultimately from Aristotle’s Politics.  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle studies the power of money to create equivalencies.  It 
facilitates the exchange of goods, even goods of widely disparate natures and values.  It 
also provides a way of finding equivalent values of abstract concepts, such as labor and 
time.  “It measures all things,” he says.25  It is obvious, Aristotle insists, that exchange 
took place before there was money.  Money simply facilitates exchange: “Money, then, 
acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them.”26 
In the Politics, on the other hand, Aristotle makes a distinction between the art of 
getting wealth and “household management” (literally, economics).27  Barter, the kind of 
                                                 
25 An Introduction to Aristotle,  ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), 
p. 409. 
26 Ibid., p. 410. 
27 A particularly valuable review of Aristotelian economic thought and its medieval 
reception is provided by Lianna Farber in An Anatomy of Trade in Medieval Writing: 
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exchange that he says in the Ethics has always existed, entails the exchange of “the 
necessities of life and nothing more.” But, he goes on, “When the use of coin had once 
been discovered, out of the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth-
getting, namely, retail trade.”28  So, there is the good and appropriate getting of wealth, 
the acquisition of the commodities needed for the proper maintenance of the household; 
and there is the art of accumulating wealth through money and trade.  This other art of 
wealth-getting  is unnecessary and undesirable.  It is, Aristotle says, “unnatural,” here in 
the sense of being against the natural order.  It is not a “natural part of the management of 
the household.”29  Money is an instrument for the measure of value; it has no value in and 
of itself because it has no use except as a method of measure.  Money is therefore not 
useful as a commodity, so there is no natural benefit to its accumulation.  And as it lends 
itself to pure accumulation, the search for monetary profit knows no natural limits: there 
is no point at which one could be said to have enough.  In fact, it is simply “a mode by 
which men gain from one another,” and it is therefore a mode of exploitation culminating 
in usury.30  And all of this is true not generally of gold or wealth or property but 
specifically of coined money:  
Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought 
to be concerned with it and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; 
                                                                                                                                                 
Value, Consent, and Community (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); see especially 
pp. 12-37. 
28 Aristotle, p. 568. 
29 Ibid., p. 570. 
30 Ibid., p. 571. 
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having to consider how they may be accumulated.  Indeed, riches is 
assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting 
wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin.  Others maintain that 
coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, 
because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, 
and because it is not useful as means to any of the necessities of life, and, 
indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food.  But 
how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and 
yet parish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer 
turned everything that was set before him into gold?  Hence men seek 
after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the mere 
acquisition of coin, and they are right.31  
These two Aristotelian positions are not necessarily irreconcilable.32  But in the 
Middle Ages these passages inspired dual traditions of interpretation.  Scholastic 
philosophers provided commentary on Ethics 5, and as Joel Kaye has shown, this text 
served as a springboard for some very sophisticated economic analysis by some 
                                                 
31 Ibid., pp. 568-69. 
32 An extensive argument for the unity and coherence of the passages in Politics and 
Ethics is provided by Scott Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought (Clarendon: Oxford, 
1995). 
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fourteenth-century scholars.33  But the Politics held greater sway over moral philosophy 
and canon law.34 
But the canonists and other moral theologians of the late Middle Ages seem to 
have been inclined to seek accommodation with the burgeoning money economy, by 
emphasizing those portions of Aristotle that were most amenable to it, and where 
necessary by revising Aristotle’s positions.  Lester K. Little, in a well-known study, 
explains the high-medieval innovation of religious poverty in the context of the money 
economy that emerged in 12th- and 13th-century Europe.35  Little demonstrates that the 
ideal of religious poverty was inspired by, predicated on, and informed by the logic of the 
commercial economy.  Furthermore, Little shows that the scholastic philosophers, so 
many of whom were in the fraternal orders, were predisposed, because of their urban and 
commercial origins, to see commercial exchange as logical and natural.  These fraternal 
thinkers, therefore, were at the forefront of the effort throughout the later Middle Ages to 
accommodate money and profit to Christian ethics.36 
                                                 
33 Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, 
and the Emergence of Scientific Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
34 Ibid., p. 53. 
35 Lester K. Little, Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1978). 
36 Jacques Le Goff provides a counter-argument to Little and others in Your Money or 
Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages, trans. Patricia Ranum (New York: 
Zone Books, 1988).  In “trying to show that how an ideological obstacle can fetter or 
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Aquinas, in addressing the question of fraud in the Summa Theologica, restates 
Aristotle’s distinction from the Politics between money as measure, which is necessary 
and useful, and money as ends, an object of accumulation, which is useless and 
dishonorable.  But then Aquinas provides an additional stipulation: 
                                                                                                                                                 
delay the development of a new economic system” (69), Le Goff maintains that 
scholastic thinkers, inheritors of ancient Hebraic and Patristic suspicions of wealth and 
profit, consistently resisted commerce and the fiduciary innovations of the money 
economy, and thereby inhibited the rise of capitalism.  However, in a subsequent book, 
Money and the Middle Ages: An Essay in Historical Anthropology, trans. Jean Birrell 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), Le Goff, while expanding on this topic, also concedes 
that “the pursuit and the use of money by individuals and by states was gradually justified 
and legitimized by the institution that inspired and governed them, the Church, despite 
the conditions it attached to this justification” (2).  See also Martha C. Howell, 
Commerce before Capitalism in Europe, 1300-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).  The most comprehensive analysis of scholastic economic thought has been 
provided in a series of works by Odd Langholm; see Wealth and Money in the 
Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources (Bergen: 
Univeristetsforlaget, 1983); Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, 
Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992); “The Medieval Schoolmen (1200-1400),” in Ancient and 
Medieval Economic Ideas and Concepts of Social Justice, ed. S. Todd Lowry and Barry 
Gordon (Leiden: Brill, 1998). See also John T. Noonan, Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of 
Usury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
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Profit which is the purpose of trade, while it does not in itself involve 
something honorable or necessary, also does not of its own nature imply 
something vicious or contrary to virtue.  Nothing prevents profit from 
being directed to a necessary or even honorable goal, so that trade is 
thereby made licit.  For example someone may seek to secure a moderate 
profit through trade to maintain his household or to support the poor or he 
may also engage in trade for the public welfare to provide his country with 
the necessities of life and seek profit not as his goal but as a recompense 
for his labor.37   
What had began in Aristotle as a principle of the unfairness of inequitable exchange has 
become in Aquinas a justification of the profit of the merchant.   
This is an example of what R. Howard Bloch has termed “the scholasticism of 
exchange”:  
The rise of scholasticism as an integral part of the urban revival of the 
High Middle Ages was even accompanied by what might be called a 
‘scholasticism of exchange.’  Canonists and theologians struggled, against 
a long anticommercial tradition, to make the kinds of distinctions and 
connections by which profit could be justified and by which even fraud 
might be exculpated.38  
                                                 
37 St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, ed. and trans. Paul E. Sigmund (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1988), pp. 73-74. 
38 R. Howard Bloch, Etymologies and Genealogies: A Literary Anthropology of the 
French Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 170. 
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From a starting point where money and profit were considered wrong, there was an effort 
to make finer and finer moral distinctions, each of which made the general practice of 
commerce incrementally more natural and licit.  At first, the seller’s profit was prima 
facie evidence of the inequality of the transaction; soon enough, an exchange was unjust 
only if the seller intended fraud.39   
 Lianna Farber has recently made the case that fourteenth-century writers, both 
within the schools and in vernacular literature, were approaching a consensus on the 
legitimacy of trade and commercial economy, based on common notions of value, 
community, and consent.40  One can see such a perspective informing Gower’s earlier 
poetry.  Both Mirour de l’Omme and Vox Clamantis contain, in their depictions of the 
third estate, extensive anti-commercial satires.  In both works, the corruption of 
merchants is embodied in allegorical figures.  But in both cases the figure represents not 
money or profit (or Mede) but rather fraud—Triche in the Mirour, Fraus in the Vox.41 
Nothing in these poems questions the legitimacy of commerce per se.  The introduction 
                                                 
39 See also Kaye, Economy and Nature, pp. 82-83, on the move in the 13th century toward 
adjudging usury solely on the basis of intention.   
40 Farber, An Anatomy of Trade, pp. 1-8 et passim. 
41 See Roger A. Ladd, “The Mirour de l’Omme and Gower’s London Merchants,” 
Antimercantilism in Late Medieval English Literature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), pp. 49-75.  See also Craig E. Bertolet, “Fraud, Division, and Lies: John Gower and 
London,” in On John Gower: Essays at the Millennium, edited by R. F. Yeager 
(Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2007), pp. 43-70. 
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of Triche is prefaced by an assertion that merchants are not only necessary but divinely 
ordained: 
 Si une terre avoir porroit 
 Tous biens ensemble, lors serroit 
 Trop orguillouse, et pour cela 
 Dieus establist, et au bon droit, 
 Qe l’une terre en son endroit 
 Del autry bien busoignera: 
 Sur quoy marchant dieus ordina, 
 Qui ce q’en l’une ne serra 
 En l’autre terre querre doit; 
 Pour ce qui bien se gardera, 
 Et loyalment marchendera, 
 De dieu et homme il est benoit. [25189-25200]42 
If one country had all goods together, then it would be too proud.  And 
therefore God established, quite rightly, that any one country would 
properly have need of others.  Thereupon God ordained merchants, who 
would go seek in another country whatever any one country did not have.  
                                                 
42 The Complete Works of John Gower: The French Works, ed. G. C. Macaulay (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1899). 
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Therefore, he who conducts himself well and trades honestly is blessed by 
God and man.43 
Chaucer’s Parson, in his discussion of Avarice, expresses almost exactly the same 
sentiment: 
Of thilke bodily marchandise that is leveful and honest is this: that, there 
as God hath ordeyned that a regne or a contree is suffisaunt to hymself, 
thanne is it honest and leveful that of habundaunce of this contree, that 
men helpe another contree that is more nedy./ And therfore ther moote 
been marchantz to bryngen fro that o contree to that oother hire 
marchandises./ That oother marchandise, that men haunten with fraude 
and trecherie and deceite, with lesynges and false othes, is cursed and 
dampnable. [X.777-79]44 
In Confessio Amantis, however, Gower is staking out positions closer to those of 
Aristotle in the Politics, and more conservative even than those of Aquinas.  Book 
5 of the Confessio begins by depicting a world fallen from an Edenic state.  It has 
fallen, though, not from innocence into corruption through sin, but from 
commonality into private property through money: 
Ferst whan the hyhe god began 
                                                 
43 Mirour de l’Omme (the Mirror of Mankind), by John Gower, trans. William Burton 
Wilson, ed. Nancy Wilson Van Baak (East Lansing, MI, 1992). 
44 Quotations of the Canterbury Tales are taken from The Riverside Chaucer, gen. ed. 
Larry D. Benson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987).  On this passage, see Ladd, 
Antimercantilism, p. 78.  
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This world, and that the kinde of man 
Was falle into no gret encress, 
For worldes good tho was no press, 
Bot al was set to the comune. 
Thei spieken thanne of no fortune 
Or forto lese or forto winne, 
Til Avarice broghte it inne; 
And that was whan the world was woxe 
Of man, of hors, of Shep, of Oxe, 
And than men knewen the moneie. [5.1-11] 
The introduction of money, according to Gower, led people to stop seeing 
material as commonly owned and intended for the common good, and instead to see it as 
commodity destined for private property.  Money does this, Gower says, by making 
hoarding both possible and appealing.  In the Confessio, Gower does not seem to see 
money as functioning to facilitate exchange.  On the contrary, he sees it as separating 
wealth from usable material in a way that inhibits the useful exchange of goods.  What it 
promotes is the accumulation of wealth in and for itself.  This leads to greed and to 
division—to the construction of battlements to protect hoarded wealth and to war to gain 
more.  But as it does not correspond to use, the wealth of money brings no profit even to 
those who accumulate it.  Gower says of the avaricious man: 
So is he povere, and everemore 
Him lacketh that he hath ynowh: 
An Oxe draweth in the plowh, 
Dismal Science  25 
Of that himself hath no profit; 
A Schep riht in the same plit 
His wolle berth, bot on a day 
An other takth the flees away: 
Thus hath he, that he noght ne hath, 
For he therof his part ne tath.  [5.40-48] 
Since he can neither spend his wealth nor, ultimately, preserve it, the avaricious man 
profits from commerce no more than the ox profits from the plow.  Speaking of plows 
and plenitude, contrast this passage from Chaucer’s Shipman’s Tale: 
But o thyng is, ye knowe it wel ynogh 
Of chapmen, that hir moneie is hir plogh. 
We may creaunce whil we have a name, 
But goldlees for to be, it is no game.  [VII.287-90] 
In the Chaucerian image, money is the plow, the harvest is credit, and the merchant is the 
plowman.  (This is the merchant of St. Denis speaking, so it may not represent an 
unmediated Chaucerian perspective.)  In the Gowerian image, the harvest is profit—but 
the merchant is the ox.  Chaucer, clearly, has a sense of productive capital.  Gower’s view 
is more broadly philosophical, but his claim that the man can no more profit from an 
abundance of wealth than an ox can profit from the plow or the sheep from its wool 
derives from Aristotelian views of the accumulation of money as unnatural since it does 
not necessarily correspond to any practical use.  Scholastic writers also emphasized the 
infertility of money, its inability to produce fruitful profit, and where they acknowledged 
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that money was quite remarkable in its ability to reproduce itself, they characterized this 
as an unnatural fecundity.45   
 Hewing to Aristotle’s anti-pecuniary critique from the Politics, the first tale 
Gower tells in Book 5 is that of Midas.  His source is Ovid Metamorphoses XI, but 
Gower glosses the tale almost precisely as Aristotle does: 
And thus, thogh that he mutliplie 
His gold, withoute tresorie 
He is, for man is noght amended 
With gold, bot if it be despended 
To mannes us.  [5.133-137] 
Particularly notable here is Gower’s use of the phrase “multiplie his gold.”  The 
meaning here is that the increase of money is vain and fruitless unless the money is 
converted to useful ends.  And yet Gower had used the same terms in Book 4 to praise 
alchemists: 
 And also with gret diligence 
 Thei founden thilke experience, 
 Which cleped is alconomie, 
 Wherof the selver multeplie 
 Thei made and ek the gold also. [4.2457-61] 
                                                 
45 See Kaye, Economy and Nature, p. 53, on the Aristotelian characterization of money as 
infertile; see also Bloch, Etymologies, p. 173, and Le Goff, Your Money, p. 29, on the 
scholastic amplification of the principle.   
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But the purpose in Book 5 is to negate the value of such multiplication; the function of 
money is to separate wealth from use, so there is no true gain in the accumulation of 
gold.46  Gower brings the point home most vividly through the tale of Midas, the climax 
coming when his golden touch prevents him from eating, leading him to the brink of 
starvation.   
Equally striking in Book 5 is Gower’s repetition and amplification of Aristotle’s 
claims from the Politics that greed and inequality, and in fact all strife, derive from the 
invention of money, and specifically from the minting of coinage:  
For this a man mai finde write, 
Tofor the time, er gold was smite 
In Coign, that men the florin knewe, 
                                                 
46 “Multiplication” is a technical term of alchemy, referring to the process, distinct from 
transmutation, by which a substance is applied to a precious metal to increase the amount 
of the metal.  See Principe, Secrets of Alchemy, p. 131; Duncan, “Literature of Alchemy,” 
pp. 634-35.  But Gower’s use of the word “multiplie” in both alchemical and economic 
contexts reveals the imagined link between money and alchemy as modes for the increase 
of wealth.  Chaucer, somewhat more self-consciously, uses the word “multiplicacioun” in 
both senses, and critics have recognized that Gower in the Confessio is exploiting the 
same ambiguity.  See A. V. C. Schmidt, The General Prologue to The Canterbury Tales 
and The Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976), p. 
154.   
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Ther was welnyh noman untrewe. [5.333-36]47 
Coinage here is not the sign of avarice, but the actual cause of it.  The problem is money 
itself: the intentional, artificial abstraction of wealth.   
And yet, in the Book 4 catalogue of founders of sciences, Genius credits Saturn 
with introducing, in addition to agriculture, coinage, and therefore commerce:  
Of Chapmanhode he fond the weie, 
And ek to coigne the moneie 
Of sondri metall, as it is, 
He was the ferste man of this...  [4.2447-50]  
This observation leads Genius to comment on metallurgy, and then directly to his account 
of alchemy.  So, why are money, coinage, gold, and wealth assessed so differently in the 
context of alchemy than they are in the economic context of Book 5? 
 We would be justified in judging these philosophical inconsistencies in the 
sprawling poem; they would not be the only ones.  We could also see Gower’s position in 
Book 5 as essentially nostalgic.  But it is a radical nostalgia, and its complaint against 
coin may actually be more historically situated than its original in Aristotle’s Politics. 
When Gower refers to a past “Tofor the time, er gold was smite/ In Coign, that 
men the florin knewe” (5.334-35), is he referring to a legendary era of misty antiquity?  
Given that this passage follows the tale of Midas, we might be inclined to think so.  As it 
happens, the Greeks did tell legends of the inventor of minting; he was Gyges, the sixth-
                                                 
47 John Peter links Gower’s “nostalgic” tone in this passage to other complaints against 
money in the Ubi sunt tradition, including Bernard’s De Contemptu Mundi.  Complaint 
and Satire in Early English Literature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), p. 70. 
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century ruler of Lydia, who is described by Herodotus and whom some modern historians 
still credit as the first king to coin money.48  The legends of Gyges, however, are not 
about minting, but rather about a ring that granted invisibility, and Gower does not tell 
his tale.  Instead, he may have had a more precise and recent era in mind.  For Gower, the 
time “before gold was smitten into coin, and men knew the florin” would be the time 
before the middle of the preceding century.  
The word “florin” could be used generically by medieval writers to mean coins or 
money.   But there is a reason that the florin became synonymous with minted money; it 
is not just any coin.  Minted in Florence first in 1252 and for three centuries thereafter, it 
was the first widely circulated gold coin minted since Carolingian times.  It quickly 
became the most popular coin in the medieval world, and was the standard unit of 
currency in western Europe through the early Renaissance.  The minting of gold coins 
like the florin (along with the Genoese genovino and the Venetian ducat), made possible 
by an influx of gold from new mines in Hungary, greatly facilitated large-scale 
international transactions. 49  The increasing circulation of money, through trade as well 
as war and taxation (overseen by new state bureaucracies), laid the groundwork for what 
                                                 
48 See David Graeber, Toward and Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of 
Our Own Dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 101-102; Marc Shell, “The Ring of 
Gyges,” in The Economy of Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1978), pp. 11-62. 
49 See Peter Spufford, Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
Dismal Science  30 
some have called the commercial revolution of the long thirteenth century.50  Gower roots 
his critique of avarice in a complaint against coinage because he is indicting the money 
economy.  From this perspective, Gower is justified in seeing the minting of gold into 
coins as the source of the social disruption he most bemoans.  Gower most consistently 
satirizes divisiveness, and nothing is more divisive than the supplanting of the common 
profit that existed before money by the individual profit motive of the money economy.  
This is embodied by Dame Avarice’s courtier Covoitise, who 
 takth non other hiede, 
Bot that he mai pourchace and gete. 
His conscience hath al forgete, 
And not what thing it mai amounte 
That he schal afterward acompte. [5.2010-14] 
In fact, for Gower “the time, er gold was smite/ In Coign” was more recent than 
the early thirteenth century.  Gold coins were minted for the first time in England in 
1344.  The first issue was an imitation of the florin and was sometimes called an English 
florin, but it was a failed specie and was quickly recalled.51  It was replaced by the 
“noble,” which was a tremendous success, becoming one of the most popular coins in 
Europe and the mainstay of English currency until the time of the Tudors.52  The image 
on the obverse of the noble, virtually unaltered for more than a century, depicted the king 
                                                 
50 See Le Goff, Money and the Middle Ages, pp. 33-60. 
51 Donald C. Baker, “Gold Coins in Mediaeval English Literature,” Speculum 36 (1961): 
282-87 (83). 
52 Spufford, Money and Its Use, pp. 282 and 379-80; Baker, “Gold Coins,” p. 284. 
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enthroned on a ship.  This was taken to commemorate Edward  III’s naval victory at 
Sluys, and more generally as figuring the confluence of imperial military ambitions, 
monarchical authority, and national economic expansion through overseas trade—all of 
which were in fact abetted by the issuance of this coinage.53  Explaining the proliferation 
of the noble, Peter Spufford observes, “In the 1350s and 1360s they were struck in 
enormous numbers as the ransoms and other profits of a successful war were remitted 
back to England in gold, along with the continuous proceeds of the sale of English 
wool.”54  As Donald Baker notes, the ship design on the noble “was also probably 
intended to inspire the merchant navy in the wool trade with Flanders.”55  The overall 
nationalistic effect can be seen in a passage from the early 15th-century “Libelle of 
Englyshe Policye”: 
For foure things our noble sheweth to mee— 
King, ship, and swerd and power of the sea. 
—But King Edward made a siege royall 
                                                 
53 Baker, “Gold Coins,” p. 284.  The motto on the noble read, “I H C AUTEM 
TRANSIENS PER MEDIUM ILLORUM IBAT.” (“He, however, passed through the 
middle of them.”)  This has been taken to refer to the victory at Sluys, but Marc Shell 
(Economy of Literature, pp. 70-71) argues that it also alludes to the Ring of Gyges and its 
ability to grant invisibility, and that the motto links Edward III to Gyges as minters of 
coins.  
54 Spufford, Money and Its Use, p. 282.  See also Le Goff, Money and the Middle Ages, p. 
87. 
55 Baker, “Gold Coins,” p. 284. 
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And wann the town and in special 
The sea was kept, and thereof he was lord, 
Thus made he nobles coined of record.56 
Russell Peck has claimed that “Gower formulated his ideas of good and bad 
kingship during the reign of Edward III.”57  Gower, Peck argues, was contemptuous of 
Edward for what he saw as the king’s weakness and moral lassitude, and also for his war 
policies.  In Confessio 5, the “division” caused by coin is seen equally in individual 
pursuit of profit and in war.  Before gold coinage, 
Tho was ther nouther schield ne spere 
Ne dedly wepne for to bere; 
Tho was the toun withoute wal, 
Which nou is closed overal; 
Tho was ther no brocage in londe, 
Which nou takth every cause on honde. 
So mai men knowe, hou the florin 
                                                 
56 Quoted in Baker, “Gold Coins,” p. 285.  On the economic nationalism of this poem, 
see John Scattergood, “The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: The Nation and Its Place,” in 
Nation, Court and Culture: New Essays on Fifteenth-Century English Poetry, ed. Helen 
Cooney (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001), pp.  28-49; Ladd, Antimercantilism, pp. 112-
19. 
57 Russell A Peck, “The Politics and Psychology of Governance in Gower: Ideas of 
Kingship and Real Kings,” in A Companion to Gower, edited by Siân Echard 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004), pp. 215-38 (224).   
Dismal Science  33 
Was moder ferst of malengin 
And bringere inne of alle werre...  [5.357-44] 
Of course, the social changes brought by the money economy were very real and 
profound.  In particular, the rise of wage labor, with the formation of a class of wage 
laborers in the towns and the expectation of cash payment for agricultural labor, altered 
social relations in ways that Gower and his contemporaries were acutely aware of.  There 
was also more immediate instability caused by the fluctuations in cash values; the 
fourteenth century has been seen as a period of monetary crisis.58  According to the 
historian Mavis Mate, “The introduction of a gold coinage had just as much impact on the 
English economy as the outbreak of the Black Death.”59 
 But Gower would never have seen the problems wrought by gold currency or 
even the disruptions of the money economy as purely economic issues.  The Confessio 
consistently depicts the ethical inextricably bound up with the political, and the 
governance of the individual mirroring the governance of the state.  James Simpson has 
argued that “the whole poem outside Book VII is a discussion of ethics and economics, a 
discussion which leads inevitably to the explicit political discourse of Book VII.”60  The 
                                                 
58 See Le Goff, Money and the Middle Ages, pp. 82-93. 
59 Mavis Mate, “The Role of Gold Coinage in the English Economy, 1338-1400,” The 
Numismatic Chronicle 18 (1978): 126-41 (126). 
60 James Simpson, Sciences and the Self in Medieval Poetry: Alan of Lille’s 
Anticlaudianus and John Gower’s Confessio amantis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 220.  See also Russell A. Peck, Kingship & Common Profit in Gower’s 
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economics that Simpson refers to, Gower’s “iconomique,” means, as it does in Aristotle, 
the governance of the household, but in Gower it is, like the self, a microcosm of society.  
“The Confessio amantis as a whole,” Simpson says, “reveals that there is no escape from 
politics.”61  It is entirely consistent, therefore, that in decrying the power of commerce to 
divide the social fabric and to undermine the common profit, Gower would focus on the 
minting of gold coins, which in his time was sanctioned by the king as both the symbol 
and the instrument of state power wedded to mercantile ambition.  Gower’s perspective is 
fundamentally nostalgic, but he is nonetheless be farsighted enough to see how much 
power would soon be invested in the centralized state through capitalism, and how 
difficult it would become to maintain the cherished ideal of kingly moral leadership when 
royal interests were married to the expansion of the national commercial economy.  
 This would explain why Gower criticizes money and coinage in Book 5 of the 
Confessio while praising alchemy and its quest for wealth in precious metals in Book 4.  
While anti-alchemical treatises accused the alchemists of artificially generating imitation 
gold, and therefore counterfeiting wealth, the alchemists themselves and their supporters 
insisted that they augmenting the true content of metals through entirely natural 
processes.  Gower therefore emphasizes that alchemy works in accordance with 
“kinde”—nature: 
 This craft is wroght be weie of kinde, 
 So that ther is no fallas inne...  [4.2508-09] 
                                                                                                                                                 
Confessio Amantis (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1978), pp. 99-123. 
61 Ibid., p. 264. 
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 These olde Philosophres wyse 
 Be weie of kinde in sondri wise 
 Thre stones maden thurgh clergie... [4.2531-33] 
Ther is algate founde a wyte, 
So that thei folwe noght the lyne 
Of the parfite medicine, 
Which grounded is upon nature... [4.2622-25] 
For Gower, as for scholastic defenders of alchemy like Albertus Magnus,62 alchemy is 
not supernatural, nor is it “artificial,” in the sense of invented.  It is empirical; Gower 
refers from the start to the “experience / Which cleped is alconomie” (4.2458-59).  And 
as Gower repeatedly states, all of the metals exist on a continuum, with silver and gold 
and the two extremes.  So the alchemical process is not one of “transmutation,” but rather 
of multiplication: “It makth multiplicacioun / Of gold” (4.2573-74).  Alchemy seeks to 
“multiply” the gold or silver in a substance by bringing out its essential nature.  
Alchemists perfect the substance, by leading it to the ideal it naturally longs for.  “For 
thei tuo”—that is, gold and silver—“ben thextremetes,/ To whiche after the propretes/ 
Hath every metal his desir/ With help and confort of the fyr” (4.2565-70).  Alchemy does 
not make something out of nothing, and it does not change one substance into another.  It 
increases what is essentially already there.   
Gower begins Book 5 of the Confessio with the words, “Obstat auaricia nature 
legibus”—“Avarice obstructs the laws of nature.”  Gower endorses alchemy before he 
excoriates money because alchemy stands in contrast to mercantilism as a myth of natural 
                                                 
62 See Newman, Promethean Ambitions, pp. 45-48. 
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wealth.  Alchemy in Book 4 is everything that money in Book 5 is not: ordered, organic, 
bounded by natural extremes, rational, obedient to consistent laws, commensurable, and 
equitable.  One of the qualities of money that most disturbed ancient and medieval 
thinkers was that, through exchange and interest, it seemed to be able to multiply itself, 
and therefore to create wealth ex nihilo, without labor or material.63  But in Gower’s 
understanding, the alchemist’s labor leads the material, through “the comfort of the fire,” 
to the ideal form it most desires. 
Some of the greatest minds of the 13th and 14th centuries worried that alchemy, by 
increasing the amount of (natural or synthetic) gold and silver, could destabilize the 
money economy.  Gower seems to have harbored greater concerns about the destabilizing 
effects of the money economy itself.  Alchemy for Gower was a myth of profit without 
money or exchange, of value that is absolute rather than relative, of wealth that is 
organic, natural, universal, elemental, and inalienable from the innate value of material.  
Alchemy allowed him, as it must have allowed many of his contemporaries, to entertain a 
vision of labor, wealth, and profit while maintaining his belief in a moral social system 
rooted in ancient concepts of justice and fair exchange.  The elixir, Gower says, can 
refine every metal, “And pureth hem be such a weie / That al the vice goth aweie” 
(4.2555-56). 
But, it is also lost.  The science itself is true, but we cannot recover it to the 
modern world, which, even by Gower’s time, was thoroughly monetized.   
 
 
                                                 
63 See Le Goff, Your Money or Your Life, pp. 29-30. 
Dismal Science  37 
Chaucer: “That slydynge science” 
“But al be that he was a philosophre,” Chaucer says of the Clerk in the General 
Prologue, “Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre” (I.297-98).  The joke reveals that Chaucer 
associates practical philosophy with alchemy, and alchemists with dishonest wealth.  This 
offhand remark at the beginning of the Canterbury Tales, though, hardly prepares the 
reader for the extensive attack on alchemy that arises abruptly near the end.   
There is much that is anomalous about the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and 
Tale.64  There is, first, the abrupt intrusion into the Canterbury pilgrimage of an 
additional wayfarer, as the burnt and bedraggled Yeoman and his heavily sweating Canon 
come galloping up to join the fellowship as the are passing Boughton-under-Blee.  The 
Yeoman, identifying himself to the curious Host, begins subtly to reveal the Canon as an 
alchemist, and the Canon flees in consternation, leaving the Yeoman to expound at much 
greater length.  The anomalousness continues with what the Ellesmere confusingly labels 
Parts I and II of the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale—really a confessional prologue and related 
tale, in the manner of the Wife of Bath and the Pardoner.65  In Part I, the Yeoman bitterly 
recalls the time, effort, and money he has lost in the workshop of his alchemical Canon, 
and indicts the hopelessly complicated obfuscations of alchemical theory.  In Part II, the 
tale, he tells of an alchemical canon—a different one, he insists, and a pure charlatan—
                                                 
64 See Judith Scherer Herz, “The Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale,” Modern 
Philology 58 (1961): 231-37. 
65 See Joseph E. Grennen, “Saint Cecilia’s ‘Chemical Wedding’: The Unity of the 
Canterbury Tales, Fragment VIII,” JEGP 65 (1966): 466-81. 
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who cons a London priest.66  The Yeoman’s choler is unusual as well.  Chaucer’s 
portraits of scoundrels are typically in the first person, or at least from the scoundrels’ 
own perspectives rather than those of their victims, and often colored with a not entirely 
feigned admiration for their ingenuity; in general, he just gives them enough rope to hang 
themselves. 
As the pilgrims wonder what is so urgent in the pair’s sudden appearance, readers 
have wondered what is so important in alchemy as a theme to merit its unusual and 
sudden introduction so late in the Canterbury frame scheme, as well as the Yeoman’s 
vehement denunciations.  There has been no sufficient explanation for why Chaucer goes 
out of his way to excoriate alchemy.  His stance has sometimes been labeled 
conventional, but as Gower’s treatment of the topic reveals there were actually competing 
conventions.  In fact, as Stanton J. Linden has shown, Chaucer is not following a tradition 
of alchemical satire, but initiating one: “In the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale we 
have the earliest significant artistic use of alchemy and the beginning of a long 
tradition—extending from the fourteenth century through the sixteenth and well into the 
                                                 
66 The London setting, too, is an anomaly. Other than the abortive Cook’s Tale, the 
Canon’s Yeoman’s is the only tale Chaucer sets in the city itself, a point explored by 
David Wallace in “Chaucer and the Absent City,” in Chaucer’s England: Literature in 
Historical Context, edited by Barbara Hanawalt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1992), pp. 59-90 (particularly 81-83). 
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seventeenth—in which a negative attitude toward the art and its practitioners is assumed 
and the reasons for this attitude exploited.”67 
                                                 
67 Stanton J. Linden, Darke Hierogliphicks: Alchemy in English Literature from Chaucer 
to the Restoration (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), p. 44.  On the 
traditional perception of alchemists as frauds, see also Tara Nummedal, “On the Utility of 
Alchemical Fraud,” in Chymists and Chymistry: Studies in the History of Alchemy and 
Early Modern Chemistry, edited by Lawrence M. Principe (Sagamore Beach, MA: 
Science History Publications, 2007), pp. 173-180.  Linden remarks “enough has been 
written to redirect attention, once and for all, from conjecture about Chaucer’s possible 
victimization at the hands of a real alchemist to explain the sudden appearance of a 
Yeoman and his Canon in the company of those with whom they alone did not set out 
from Southwark” (42).  That conjecture dates at least to the eighteenth century (see 
Linden, p. 305 n. 24) and was elaborated, naturally, by John M. Manly in Some New 
Light on Chaucer (New York: Holt, 1926), pp. 246-47.  An even older tradition, from the 
fifteenth century, holds that Chaucer’s detailed knowledge of alchemical lore reveals him 
as a adept and practitioner of the craft.  See Robert M. Schuler, “The Renaissance 
Chaucer as Alchemist,” Viator 15 (1984): 305-33; Edgar H. Duncan, “The Literature of 
Alchemy and Chaucer’s Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale: Framework, Theme, and Characters,” 
Speculum 43 (1968): 633-56 (particularly p. 656); Gareth W. Dunleavy, “The Chaucer 
Ascription in Trinity College, Dublin MS D.2.8,” Ambix 13 (1965): 2-21; Anke 
Timmermann, “New Perspectives on ‘The Chaucer Ascription in Trinity College, Dublin 
MS D.2.8,” Ambix 53 (2006): 161-65.  This view, too, has its modern adherents; see 
Jonathan Hughes, The Rise of Alchemy in Fourteenth-Century England (London: 
Dismal Science  40 
Perhaps because of this, and perhaps also because the Yeoman’s critique of 
alchemy is in parts nearly as recondite as its object, the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale has been 
less studied than many of the Canterbury Tales.  In recent years, though, interest has 
increased in the Canon’s Yeoman’s sequence, and much of the analysis has been acute. 
Three analyses in particular share both this critical standard of excellence and also a 
fruitful focus on science, technology, and economics as the text’s most significant 
themes.   
Britton Harwood offers a Marxist reading of the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale as a 
“mystification of work,” an example of Chaucer’s refusal to dramatize “productive 
capital”—payment for labor to make a product that is not owned by the laborer but is sold 
by the investor for profit.68  For Harwood, the Yeoman is “the only wage laborer 
anywhere in Chaucer—the only laborer hired to make a commodity,” and alchemy 
mimics industrial labor only to obscure it with magic and exoticism.69  Lee Patterson also 
                                                                                                                                                 
Continuum, 2012), pp. 75-76.  Others, like Principe, make the more reasonable claim that 
“Chaucer does not... conclude that transmutational alchemy is false; rather, it is a 
privileged kind of knowledge with which only a select few should dare to meddle” (The 
Secrets of Alchemy, p. 182), but I think that much more accurately describes Gower’s 
positions than Chaucer’s. 
68 Britton J. Harwood, “Chaucer and the Silence of History: Situating the Canon’s 
Yeoman’s Tale,” PMLA 102 (1987): 338-350 (342). 
69 Ibid., p. 343. 
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sees the Yeoman as exploited labor, “a personal servant, perhaps even an apprentice.”70   
Expanding on Harwood’s analysis, Patterson claims that alchemy in the tale offers the 
promise not only of wealth but of a theoretical and empirical advancement in the human 
condition, that is, of technology, and when it proves false the Yeoman is disabused but 
maintains this technological view of human practice as well as a technologized sense of 
himself as a modern individual, making him the ideal subject to embrace modernity and 
capitalism.  And Peggy Knapp links Chaucer’s text to Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist, for 
their emphasis on work and their use of alchemy to satirize nascent capitalism.71  Like 
Harwood and Patterson, Knapp sees the Yeoman as a laborer in the Canon’s 
technological industry, but in the Yeoman’s rebellion against the his lord she also sees 
the Marxian potential for the demystification of the workings of the capitalist process and 
the self-actualization and liberation of the worker.  Knapp concludes that “modernity 
inhabits this tale.”72 
All of these approaches share a very fruitful emphasis on science, technology, and 
economics in the Canon’s Yeoman sequence.  But they also share a progressive view of 
economics, a Marxian view of labor and capital, and a view of alchemy as a metaphor for 
both capitalism and for industrial technology, all of which may not be entirely 
                                                 
70 Lee Patterson, “Perpetual Motion: Alchemy and the Technology of the Self,” Studies in 
the Age of Chaucer 15 (1993): 25-57 (30). 
71 Peggy Knapp, “The Work of Alchemy,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern 
Studies 30 (2000): 575-99. 
72 Ibid., p. 584. 
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appropriate to this text, and may in fact obscure Chaucer’s own particular fourteenth-
century understanding of science, technology, and economics. 
  It is necessary, first, to reconsider the reading of the Yeoman as industrial wage 
laborer.  The critical tradition of taking the Yeoman to be the Canon’s paid employee or 
indentured apprentice seems to derive primarily from the meaning in other contexts of the 
word “yeoman.”73  Everything in the Yeoman’s own description of the alchemical 
workshop suggests a collective enterprise: 
 I wol speke of oure werk. 
What we been there as we shul exercise 
Oure elvysshe craft, we semen wonder wise, 
Oure termes been so clergial and so queynte...  
Oure orpyment and sublymed mercurie, 
Oure grounden litarge eek on the porfurie, 
Of ech of thise of ounces a certeyn— 
Noght helpeth us; our labour is in veyn. 
Ne eek oure spirites ascencioun, 
Ne oure materes that lyen al fix adoun, 
Mowe in oure werkyng no thyng us availle, 
For lost is al oure labour and travaille; 
And al the cost, a twenty devel waye, 
Is lost also, which we upon it laye.  [VIII.749-53, 774-83] 
                                                 
73 See Patterson, “Perpetual Motion,” p. 30. 
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The Yeoman’s language suggests, most conspicuously in his pervasive use of the first-
person plural, that he is not merely a servant but a partner in the endeavors of the Canon’s 
workshop.  In fact, while he complains of the time and pains and injuries of his labor, he 
quite explicitly figures himself as a capital investor in the alchemical enterprise.  After 
yet another kiln explosion ruins another attempt to realize the Canon’s theories, the 
Yeoman imagines one of his anonymous partners asserting,  
Us moste putte oure good in aventure. 
A marchant, pardee, may nat ay endure, 
Trusteth me wel, in his prosperitee. 
Somtyme his good is drowned in the see, 
And somtyme comth it sauf unto the londe.  [VIII.946-50] 
The Yeoman and his collaborators do not think they are wage-laborers or servants.   
 Is this just the false consciousness of an essentially proletarian worker?  There is a 
greater problem with thinking of the Yeoman as the alienated laborer of industrial 
capitalism.  Even if the Canon were paying the Yeoman for his services, it would not 
really be appropriate to characterize alchemy as “productive capital” in as much as, from 
Chaucer’s perspective—and this is the core of the Yeoman’s entire discourse— alchemy 
does not and cannot produce anything.74  Lawrence Principe, reacting to a modern 
                                                 
74 What this might indicate is that not even the Canon’s Yeoman is a wage-laborer, and 
that productive capital is even more thoroughly erased from the Canterbury Tales than 
Harwood claims.  If so, this would point toward some of the facts of economic life in a 
market society that Chaucer was not conscious of and that mark his work with their 
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tradition that has often taken alchemy as essentially a set of philosophical or theoretical 
tropes, emphasizes that in its historical contexts alchemy was “a productive enterprise.  
Producing new materials and transforming or improving common ones forms a central 
theme within alchemical tradition.”75  For historians of science, this is key, as the 
empirical practices of alchemy can be shown to lay the groundwork for much later 
science, particularly in chemistry.  But for understanding Chaucer, it is more important to 
recognize that his Canon’s Yeoman does not believe alchemy capable of anything but 
wasting one’s time, labor, and money.  The Yeoman’s primary complaint is not of being 
exploited by the Canon but of being deceived by alchemy.76   
 Patterson acknowledges that “the discourse of alchemy raises the problem of the 
verbal representation of truth with a special intensity and sophistication.”77  But he and 
others critics, including Knapp, see alchemy as fostering a technologized mentality that 
laid the groundwork for modernization.  In this, they are again following historians of 
science, notably Principe and Newman, who advance an “empiricist” understanding of 
alchemy.  No one denies that the pursuit of the “multiplying” of metals was vain or that 
many alchemists were crackpots or charlatans, but the empiricist view holds that 
                                                                                                                                                 
absence.  But if we want to know what Chaucer did think about alchemy and economics, 
productive capital and wage labor are not the keys. 
75 Principe, Secrets of Alchemy, p. 208 (emphasis Principe’s.)  See also Newman and 
Principe, Alchemy Tried in the Fire, pp. 38-44.  
76 See Richard Firth Green, “Changing Chaucer,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 25 
(2002): 27-52. 
77 Patterson, “Perpetual Motion,” p. 39. 
Dismal Science  45 
alchemy, often in defiance of a more hidebound hierarchy that privileged only textual 
authority, nonetheless combined theory and practice in a novel way that anticipated 
modern science.  Newman claims that “the alchemists of the Middle Ages developed a 
clearly articulated philosophy of technology, in which human art is raised to a level of 
appreciation difficult to find in other writings until the Renaissance.”78  Principe also 
argues for the integral role of alchemy in the development of technological and scientific 
modes of thought, and he places the arrival of alchemical lore in Western Europe within 
the context of the “Renaissance of the  Twelfth Century.”  But Principe acknowledges 
that alchemy was only one of many fields of technical learning that became available or 
more widely accessible to Western Europeans at the same time: “Muslim scholars had 
made their own considerable advances, providing Europeans with a wealth of additional 
knowledge and ideas in astronomy, medicine, mathematics, physics, mechanics, botany, 
engineering, and fields completely new to Europe—such as al-kimiya’.  In the twelfth 
century, Europe not only accepted these ideas but hungered for them.”79  A case can be 
made that the experimental protocols and empirical processes of alchemy made special 
                                                 
78 William Newman, “Technology and the Alchemical Debate in the Late Middle Ages,” 
Isis 80 (1989): 423-45 (433).  See Patterson, “Perpetual Motion,” p. 51. 
79 Principe, “Secrets of Alchemy,” p. 52.  See also Edward Grant, The Foundations of 
Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual 
Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), particularly pp. 168-206; 
Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, “Translations and Translators,” in Renaissance and Renewal 
in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable with Carol D. Lanham 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 421-62 (particularly pp. 439-57). 
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contributions to the birth of scientific thought.80  But the question is why we should 
consider the discipline important to Chaucer’s intellectual development when he is so 
overtly hostile to it.  There is, I think, another technology that better fits the bill, one that 
Chaucer demonstrates a keen interest in throughout the Canterbury Tales, that functions 
efficaciously in everyday practice, and that was inspired by and also inspired complex 
theoretical and analytical thought, often in a context that associates it with proto-
scientific views of nature and with analytical measurement of natural phenomena.  That 
technology is money. 
 The case for money as a technology has been made by Joel Kaye.  Kaye 
specifically refers to “the technological form of money in exchange.”  In this form, Kaye 
maintains, money amounts to “an extendable, divisible, graded, and numbered continuum 
used as a common measuring scale, capable of expressing constantly shifting and diverse 
values in common numerical terms, and thus facilitating relation between seemingly 
incommensurable goods and services in exchange.”81  In this technological form, Kaye is 
able to locate in money the rationalist and scientific impetus that Newman and the literary 
critics that follow him find in alchemy.  
Kaye’s project is to construct a social context for a remarkable branch of thought 
in the first half of the fourteenth century.  During this period, a group of scholars known 
                                                 
80 One of the strongest arguments for this view is made by William R. Newman in Atoms 
and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
81 Kaye, Economy and Nature, p. 171.  See also Multhauf, Origins of Chemistry, pp. 151-
52. 
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later as the “Oxford Calculators” as well as some of their contemporaries at the 
University of Paris engaged in a range of studies of measurement and quantification of a 
wide variety of social and natural phenomena.  The impetus for this “measuring mania,” 
Kaye maintains, was money.  Although as university scholars they were presumably 
removed from the world of the marketplace, these thinkers could not help, if only because 
of the exigencies of university administration, being immersed in the thoroughly 
monetized society of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
 Scholars were already engaged in debates on Aristotelian theories of money, 
business, and ethics, as well as problems of measurement of a physical universe they 
conceived as existing along series of continua not divisible into discrete units.  Their 
practical experience with money in the commercial economy exposed them to a system 
that made equivalencies among widely disparate objects and ideas—commodities and 
products; time and effort; labor and expertise; scarcity and demand.  Through this, Kaye 
argues, scholars came to see money in its technological form: “When people of the 
fourteenth century looked at coined money in their hand, they saw a round, discrete 
object—in rough geometrical terms, a point.  However, as writers on money from 
Aristotle through the scholastic theorists to the twentieth century have realized, money in 
fact functions as a line, a connecting medium (to use the word attached to it by Aristotle 
and the scholastics), a measuring scale composed of a divisible and expandable 
continuum of value.”  Kaye calls this model “the technological form of money in 
exchange”: “an extendable, divisible, graded, and numbered continuum used as a 
common measuring scale, capable of expressing constantly shifting and diverse values in 
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common numerical terms, and thus facilitating relation between seemingly 
incommensurable goods and services in exchange.”82 
Philosophers in Oxford and Paris produced treatises of considerable subtlety and 
complexity, which they then shared and debated.  Such economics inspired these scholars 
to analyze a range of phenomena and systems in the social and natural worlds, applying 
from economics methods of measurement with abstract but discrete units.  “Every 
‘quality’ capable of increase or decrease, whether physical or mental, came to be 
visualized as a divisible, continuous magnitude in the process of expansion or 
contraction,” Kaye explains.  “In Oxford and Paris, elaborate logical and mathematical 
languages were devised to describe and conceptually measure quantified qualities now 
conceived as divisible continua.”83  This application of analytical measurement to the 
natural world, Kaye concludes, lay the foundation for the scientific advances of 
subsequent centuries.   
 Chaucer, of course, was no “Oxford Calculator.”  He did not attend university; he 
was a layman and a secular poet; he wrote in the second half of the fourteenth century. 
But he was immersed in the world of money and commerce throughout his life, very 
often in the kind of administrative position that Kaye sees as key to the perspectives of 
fourteenth-century scholastics.  (He would therefore have dealt daily with what Kaye 
calls “the technological form of money in administration”: “a continuous numbered scale 
superimposed by the administrator on a given problem in measurement and gradation, to 
                                                 
82 Ibid., p. 171. 
83 Ibid., pp. 166-67. 
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the end of finding ranges of equalization and points of proportional division.”)84  Much of 
Chaucer’s poetry—notably in the Shipman’s Tale— reveals an interest in the workings of 
money and commerce, and of remarkably sophisticated forms of monetary valuation and 
exchange, what modern economists call “financial instruments.”  Also, throughout his 
career—from the complicated disquisitions on acoustics in House of Fame to the 
technological instruction of the Treatise on the Astrolabe— he demonstrated an interest 
in science and the measurement of natural phenomena.  And we can see the confluence of 
these two interests in, among other places, the Summoner’s Tale, where the friar’s pursuit 
of a reasonably divisible sum of money is converted through the “unexpected gift” into 
an obscene and seemingly absurd challenge of dividing into equal quantities an 
apparently intangible substance: “To parte that wol nat departed be/ To every man 
yliche” (III.2214-15).85 
What I am proposing, then, is that Chaucer had considerable experience with the 
“technological form of money,” that he was interested enough in it to represent its 
operations complexly and in detail in much of his work, and that he on some level also 
comprehended it as an application of a theoretical system we might (though he did not) 
call economics.86  Furthermore, his understanding of the social technology of money 
                                                 
84 Ibid., pp. 174-75. 
85 See Robert Epstein, “Sacred Commerce: Chaucer, Friars, and the Spirit of Money,” in 
Sacred and Profane in Chaucer and Late Medieval Literature, ed. Robert Epstein and 
William Robins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), pp. 129-45. 
86 Naturally, Chaucer also had experience with the physical form of money, that is, with 
coin, and he could characterize it in a tone that recalls Gower.  For instance, when the 
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abetted his comprehension of the phenomenological systems of the natural world, that he 
saw that natural processes could be perceived as measurable, predictable, and rational, 
and that this amounted to an incipiently scientific world view.   
If so, then Chaucer would not need alchemy to gain a technological or scientific 
perspective.  On the contrary, in comparison to more practical technologies, alchemy 
would appear to him to be misleading and insufficient.  And on the evidence of the 
Canon’s Yeoman’s sequence, it did.   
The Yeoman’s complains first and foremost of the frustration inherent to the 
practice of alchemy. 87  Faced with failure after failure in their efforts to produce the 
desired metallurgical effects, the Yeoman and his partners find themselves in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pardoner’s three “riotours” seek Death under an oak, they find “floryns fyne of gold 
ycoyned rounde” (VI.770).  Not all of Chaucer’s references to coinage are so pejorative; 
the Miller says of Alison, “Ful brighter was the shynyng of her hewe / Than in the Tour 
the noble yforged newe” (I.3255-56).  See Baker, “Gold Coins,” pp. 282, 286.  Notably, 
when the canon in the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale persuades the priest to hazard his gold in 
the prospect of multiplying it in the canon’s laboratory, the priest fetches his store of 
English gold coins: “This preest the somme of fourty pound anon / Of nobles fette” 
(VIII.1364-65). 
87 On Chaucer’s treatment of alchemy, see John Reidy’s explanatory notes to the Canon’s 
Yoeman’s Prologue and Tale in the Riverside Chaucer, pp. 946-51.  See also Edgar Hill 
Duncan, “The Yeoman’s Canon’s ‘Silver Citrinacioun,’” Modern Philology 37 (1940): 
241-62, as well as Duncan, “The Literature of Alchemy and Chaucer’s Canon’s 
Yeoman’s Tale.” 
Dismal Science  51 
impossible position of trying to reproduce erroneous results, and ever hopeful, they are 
rewarded only with lost materials and oven explosions and wasted time and effort and 
expense.  If we were to seek a modern analogue to alchemy as conceived by the Canon’s 
Yeoman, it would be neither commercial manufacturing, as Harwood suggests, nor 
chemical engineering, as Patterson and Newman imply.  It would instead be cold 
fusion—a seemingly scientific process that leads its hopeful adherents down a rabbit hole 
of impossible duplication.   
But the Yeoman also stresses that alchemy is as flawed in theory as it is in 
practice.  Alchemical doctrine seems at first convincingly concrete, with a vast lexicon of 
materials and methods, and a philosophy, rejecting magical thinking, that places it firmly 
in the realm of natural process and invariable universal laws.  But the deeper it is 
pursued, the more it deliquesces into evasiveness and obscurantism, the alchemist’s 
notorious “secree” and “privetee.”  The “cursed craft” (VIII.830) is simply impervious to 
direct investigation, as the Yeoman illustrates with an anecdote of a disciple of Plato, 
That on a tyme seyde his maister to, 
As his book Senior bere witnesse, 
And this was his demande in soothfastnesse: 
“Telle me the name of the privee stoon.” 
And Plato answerde unto hym anoon, 
“Take the stoon that Titanos men name.” 
“Which is that?” quod he.  “Magnasia is the same,” 
Seyde Plato.  “Ye, sire, and is it thus? 
This is ignotum per ignocius. 
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What is Magnasia, good sire, I yow preye?” 
“It is a water that is maad, I seye, 
Of elementes foure,” quod Plato. 
“Telle me the roote, good sire,” quod he tho, 
“Of that water, if it be youre wil.” 
“Nay, nay,” quod Plato, “certein, that I nyl.”  [VIII.1449-64]88 
Ultimately, the Yeoman concludes, alchemical theory can offer nothing more than 
“ignotum per ignocius,” a logical fallacy of explaining the unknown with more 
unknowns—deception by infinite regress.  
 Thus Canon’s Yeoman’s “Plato” explains to his skeptical disciple why he cannot 
reveal to him the ultimate source of the “privee stoon”: 
“The philosophres sworn were everychoon 
That they sholden discovere it unto noon, 
                                                 
88 On Chaucer’s invention of this anecdote, see Reidy, p. 951, and Julius Ruska, 
“Chaucer und das Buch Senior,” Anglia 61 (1937): 136-137.  The book Chaucer refers to 
is a Latin translation of a 10th-century Arabic work by Muhammad ibn Umail, Epistle of 
the Sun to the Crescent Moon.  Reidy, citing an unpublished paper by Edgar Hill Duncan, 
explains that Chaucer’s understanding of the title of work as Senior and the author as 
Plato derive apparently from the annotations in a fourteenth-century English manuscript.  
But Chaucer seems very deliberately to have fashioned a few sentences of Latin 
alchemical lore into his exemplum of an alchemical Plato and his deployment of ignotum 
per ignocius.  The relevant passages from Chaucer’s Latin source text are published in 
Bryan and Dempster, Sources and Analogues, pp. 697-98. 
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Ne in no book it write in no manere. 
For unto Christ it is so lief and deere 
That he wol nat that it discovered bee, 
But where it liketh to his deitee 
Men for t’enspire, and eek for to deffende 
Whom that hym liketh; lo this is the ende.” [VII.1464-71] 
Chaucer is apparently untroubled by the anachronism of Plato claiming that alchemy is 
“unto Christ... so lief and deere.”  This is an exemplary anecdote in the Canon’s 
Yeoman’s critique, meant to illustrate the ways in which alchemists sophistically lead 
their acolytes on while always refusing to ground their claims in observable fact.  The 
claim that God loves the secret too much to allow it to be discovered, except when it 
mysteriously and unpredictably “liketh to his deitee” to reveal it in order to provide 
inspiration, is merely “Plato”’s last rhetorical gambit, after which he tries to cut off 
further questions: “lo, this is the ende.” 
 Oddly, “Plato”’s assertion that “unto Christ it is so lief and deere” has frequently 
been taken as Chaucer’s own avowal of the ultimate holiness and authenticity of 
alchemy.  But the Canon’s Yeoman’s own conclusion makes it clear that he finds 
alchemy insupportable: 
Thanne conclude I thus, sith that the God of hevene 
Ne wil nat that the philosophres nevene 
How that a man shal come unto this stoon, 
I rede, as for the beste, lete it goon. 
For whoso maketh God his adversarie, 
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As for to werken any thyng in contrarie 
Of his wil, certes, never shal he thryve, 
Thogh that he multiplie terme of his lyve. 
And there a poynt, for ended is my tale. 
God sende every trewe man boote of his bale! [VII.1472-81] 
This bears some resemblance to Gower’s assertion that modern men should not seek after 
the secrets of alchemy, but it is fundamentally different.  Gower’s claim is that alchemy 
is an authentic, empirical discipline, asserting that “The science of himself is trewe” 
(4.2598) and that “ther is no fallas inne” (4.2509).  In Gower’s telling, alchemy was 
discovered and perfected by the ancients, but it is now entirely a lost art.  But Chaucer 
(through a wholly unauthorized alteration of sources) depicts Plato, among the most 
authoritative of ancient philosophers, as unable and unwilling to ground the claims of 
alchemy in empirical observation.  The Canon’s Yeoman’s conclusion, that God does not 
wish philosophers to identify the process of coming to the stone,  is his way of saying that 
this supposedly secret knowledge simply is not accessible to man though the systematic 
observation of natural processes.   He who seeks the secrets of alchemy, he says, “maketh 
God his adversarie”—not, primarily, in the sense that this occultism is cursed, but rather 
in that God has not allowed its supposed truths to be accessible through the application of 
reason to the created world—which is to say, it is not scientific.  
Alchemy is, in the Yeoman’s term, “that slydynge science” (VIII.732), that 
slippery science, that maintains the appearance of rationality and holds out the promise of 
practicality but cannot deliver.  Chaucer comes to alchemy with a notion of what science 
should be, derived from other sources—including, I am suggesting, the operation of 
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money in a market economy.  It entails regular measurement of results along consistent 
continua, observable phenomena, and logically accessible rules that can explain and 
predict results.  Historians may well demonstrate that medieval alchemy manifested all of 
these qualities, but Chaucer seems not to have seen it so.  And alchemy therefore looks to 
him like a pseudo-science. 
 And yet, in this context, I think the economic elements of alchemy are even more 
central to the significance of the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale.  In fact, the most important part 
of the tale is one that is seldom noted even by those who have shown an interest in this 
understudied text.  It is not the ostensible “actual work” of the alchemical workshop—the 
priest and the canon laboring to manipulate metals in the flames—but rather the lure that 
the canon uses to take in the priest in the first place. 
 The canon, of course, is playing a con.  At the core of every con is not the 
betrayal of the mark’s confidence but rather the rapport that the conman constructs in 
order to obtain that confidence. The concept is best described by another arch-conman of 
fiction, the veteran grifter Mike, played by Joe Mantegna in David Mamet’s film House 
of Games: “The basic idea is this: it’s called a ‘confidence’ game.  Why?  Because you 
give me your confidence?  No.  Because I give you mine.”89  At the conclusion of his 
                                                 
89 David Mamet, House of Games: The Complete Screenplay (New York: Grove Press, 
1985), p. 34.  This initial part of the classic con is called the “rope” by the early 
twentieth-century American conmen in David Maurer’s classic sociological study, The 
Big Con: The Story of the Confidence Man (1940; reprint New York: Anchor Books, 
1999). 
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tale, Chaucer says as much of his crooked canon: “Thus maketh he is introduccioun,/ To 
brynge folk to hir destruccioun” (VIII.1386-87). 
Therefore, in what is by far the cleverest part of the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale, the 
canon goes about gaining the priest’s trust by first approaching him to ask for a loan.  
Chaucer tells us precisely one thing about this priest of London who is the canon’s target:  
In Londoun was a preest, an annueleer, 
That therinne dwelled hadde many a yeer, 
Which was so plesaunt and so servysable 
Unto the wyf, where as he was at table, 
That she wolde suffre hym no thyng for to paye 
For bord ne clothyng, wente he never so gaye, 
And spendynge silver hadde he right ynow.  [VIII.1012-18] 
The most obvious point here is that the priest has enough cash on hand to make him a 
worthwhile mark for a conman.  But the passage also reveals that the priest has the kind 
of mentality to make him a likely mark.  The priest’s landlady finds him “so plesaunt and 
so servysable” that she suspends his contractual obligation to pay for his board.  The 
priest responds not by recognizing any obligation to return the landlady’s generosity, but 
by blithely embracing the windfall as a personal profit.  What this tells us is that the priest 
is accustomed to benefiting materially from a suspension of the usual economic rules.  
The canon must see this as well, and recognizes in him the quintessential quality of a 
mark: a sense of entitlement.   
The canon’s “introduccioun” to the priest could hardly be more simple.  He asks 
the priest to lend him a mark, and promises to pay it back in three days.  The priest 
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agrees, and three days later, the canon pays him back the mark. The priest is 
tremendously impressed by this. It shows him that the canon “so trewe is of condicioun/ 
That in no wise breke wole his day;/ To swich a man I kan never seye nay” (VIII.1039-
41).  “What!” replies the canon,  
sholde I be untrewe? 
Nay, that were thyng yfallen al of newe. 
Trouthe is a thyng that I wol evere kepe... 
God thanke I, and in good tyme be it sayd, 
That ther was nevere man yet yvele apayd 
For gold ne silver that he to me lente, 
Ne nevere falshede in myn herte I mente... 
Syn ye so goodlich han been unto me, 
And kithed to me so greet gentillesse, 
Somwhat to quyte with youre kyndenesse... (VIII.1042-44, 1048-51, 1053-55) 
The canon offers to reveal to the priest the “pryvetee” of his “philosophie.”  Later, the 
canon will “allow” the Priest to perform alchemical maneuvers with his own hands “in 
tokenyng I thee love” (VIII.1153).   
The tricks that the canon performs in the rest of the tale, the trade secrets of 
alchemy that the Yeoman is betraying, turn out not to be particularly impressive in their 
sophistication or ingenuity.  The canon employs no dazzling mental one-upmanship, but 
rather readymade props, like a hollowed-out ember in which silver filings are hidden, and 
sleight-of-hand, and sometimes simply the crudest form of misdirection; the canon 
simply gets the priest to look away, and substitutes a silver ingot for a copper ingot.  
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Anyone but a willing gull would see through these tricks easily; they work only because 
the priest’s confidence has already been established.   
For the Yeoman, the moral is clear: “Ful sooth it is that swich profred servyse/ 
Stynketh” (VIII.1066-67).  Unrequested favors stink.  It is the motto of all con men; 
Mamet’s Mike puts it only slightly differently: “Don’t trust nobody.”90  The London 
priest’s particular folly is to think that because the canon repays his debt on time and 
without having to be hounded, it indicates that the loan established a personal relationship 
beyond the economic transaction.  After a simple monetary exchange—the priest lends 
the canon one mark; the canon pays it back—the canon gets the priest to slide into the 
romantic language of honor, fealty and obligation: “trouthe”; “bileve”; “gentillesse”; 
“kyndenesse”; “love tokenyng.”91  The confidence in this confidence game is based on 
                                                 
90 Mamet, House of Games, p. 37. 
91 Although the canon is, in terms of his plan, earning what we term the priest’s 
“confidence,” to the priest’s understanding the canon is establishing his “credit”—a word 
that was coming to connote both moral character and commercial reliability.  Martha C. 
Howell remarks that “in this culture personal honor, what was coming to be called a 
man’s ‘credit,’ was not only the mark of social legitimacy but also the essential guarantor 
of market integrity” (Commerce before Capitalism, p. 151).  The canon’s romance 
language, though dramatically ironic as well as jarring to the modern reader, arises 
organically from the fiduciary context that the canon has created for the priest.  As 
Howell notes, “A man of credit had become a man of honor” (29).  See also Craig 
Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in 
Early Modern England (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).   
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the Priest’s assumption that the usual rules of economic relationships do not apply to him 
and the canon, but that he can get rich quick anyway.   Before he is a fool for false 
science, he is first a fool for false economics. 
This nexus of alchemy, economy, and greed is central to the Yeoman’s own 
moralization of his tale: 
Considereth, sires, how that, in ech estaat, 
Bitwixe men and gold ther is debaat 
So ferforth that unnethes is ther noon. 
This multiplying blent so many oon 
That in good feith I trowe that it bee 
The cause grettest of swich scarsetee. 
Philosophres speken so mystily 
In this craft that men kan nat come therby, 
For any wit that men han nowe-a-dayes... 
A man may lightly lerne, if he have aught, 
To multiplie, and brynge his good to naught! [VIII.1388-96, 1400-01] 
As in Gower, the word “multiplying” signals the convergence of alchemical and 
economic discourses.92  In all estates, Chaucer says, “Bitwixe men and gold ther is 
debaat,” due, obviously, to man’s irrational but inevitable greed.  So “blent” and deluded, 
they misunderstand natural processes (as through alchemy) and social processes (like the 
                                                 
92 See Schmidt, General Prologue, p. 162; W. W. Skeat, ed., The Works of Geoffrey 
Chaucer, vol. 5 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1900), p. 420. Duncan, “The Literature of 
Alchemy,” sees the term “multiplicacioun” as key to the tale’s meaning.  
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economic forces of the marketplace).  Thus a desire for “multiplying” is paradoxically the 
cause of “scarsetee.” As Kaye’s model suggests, an analytical and practical 
understanding of the economic world could lead Chaucer to an understanding of the laws 
and principles governing the natural world.  Alchemy, in contrast, is false economics that 
leads to false chemistry.  For Chaucer, alchemy is where pseudo-science meets pseudo-
social-science.  
 What alchemy is not, for Chaucer, is a metaphor for capitalism.  It is, to a large 
extent, its opposite.  The forces of a collective market in which each agent pursues 
individual self-interest—that is, economics— are, if properly observed, rational, 
explicable, and open to analysis.  Alchemy, with its chicanery, self-delusion, and magical 
thinking, is not.   
This is not to say, though, that Chaucer possesses a classical understanding of 
economics.  Classical economists, and to an even greater extent neo-classical economists, 
see the market as universal, transhistorical, and inevitable, in other words, as natural.  But 
a technological conception of money should lead one to see market economics as an 
artificial phenomenon—not false, but not natural.  It is man-made.  Aristotle says as 
much in the Ethics, where he concedes that money is not natural, but he emphasizes that 
it is artificial in the sense not that it is a violation of nature but in the sense that it is a 
man-made convention, which, like other inventions, can be used for the good.  The name 
“money” (nomisma), he notes, derives from nomos, “law,” “because it exists not by 
nature but by law, and it is in our power to change it.”93  In the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale, 
market transactions and monetized relationships are not the only possible kinds of human 
                                                 
93 Aristotle, p. 409 
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interactions.  One can, like the canon, assume that “profred servyce stynketh,” and treat 
others instrumentally in interactions designed for personal profit.  Or one can behave like 
the priest’s landlady, who, out of a sense of personal connection, gives the priest his 
board and ignores his contractual obligation to repay her.  Her actions are based not on 
personal profit, but on the social value of granting exemptions, thereby affirming and 
extending relationships that are independent of competition and calculation of a market 
transaction.  She treats her interaction with the priest essentially as a gift relationship.  
The folly of the priest is to think that he can individually profit from the money economy 
while naively maintaining associations and values from earlier and different systems—
like the gift values of his landlady, or the faux-courtly devotion of the canon.  Chaucer 
could learn from the functioning of market economics to apprehend rational and 
measurable patterns in the natural world.  But I also think that he understood that 
economics describes human behaviors in one particular context, the market and the 
money economy, a context that was in his time relatively new.  It was new enough for 
Chaucer to know that there are other value systems besides the market, and other choices 
for rational agents besides individual, competitive self-interest.  But society and the self 
must therefore not be naturally defined by money or market competition.  So, while 
Chaucer’s economic imagination is not that of Marx, it is also not that of Adam Smith, 
and even less that of Friedrich Hayek.   
Just as important, Chaucer’s economics are not Gower’s.  Alchemy is for both 
Chaucer and Gower an essential trope for understanding economics.  But whereas Gower 
idealizes alchemy as a vision of natural increase and pure wealth that is the opposite of 
the monetized economy, Chaucer reviles alchemy as the obscurantist antithesis of both 
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scientific technology and economics, which are logical systems that, while artificial, can 
only be understood rationally and empirically. 
